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ABSTRACT 
This article argues that welfare-to-work or activation policies, which have been 
adopted across a range of OECD countries during the last two decades, do not only 
have led to changes in the substance of the welfare state but also to transformations in 
its institutional configuration. This institutional transformation includes the spatial re-
configuration of the welfare state, which has given new roles to the supra-national, 
national, and sub-national levels of government as well as private actors in the 
management and creation of labor market policies. By bringing institutions into these 
debates, this article seeks to expand the literature on welfare-to-work and activation as 
to date authors working on this topic have said very little about the degree, types, and 
reasons for the spatial re-configuration of welfare-to-work policies across different 
states. To fill a gap in the literatures on changes in the welfare state and its territorial 
configuration in particular, we compare trends in the re-configuration of welfare-to-
work policies in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. We find that there is a 
cross-national trend, when it comes to the institutional effects of the implementation 
of activation. These trends bear a tension between decentralization and centralization, 
as both central and sub-national levels of government have acquired new 
responsibilities to implement the activation paradigm. 
INTRODUCTION 
Comparative research on contemporary transformations of the welfare state 
(WS) has tended to focus on changes in the content and generosity of social policies 
rather than on the potential consequences of these changes for institutional 
configurations. For instance, many authors have noted that in the last decade many 
advanced industrial states, the European Union and the OECD have been emphasizing 
the implementation of 'activation'' policies. These policies differ from both 'passive' 
and more traditional 'active' labor market policies (PLMPs and ALMPs) in that they 
seek to remove 'dependency' and emphasize individual responsibility for labor 
market integration (for example by making 'active' job seeking behavior a condition 
for benefit receipt) as they undermine demand-side policies? This article focuses on 
activation policies as their widespread implementation is often perceived as affecting 
the nature of theWS-from a provider of 'passive' benefits and 'inducer of 
dependency' to a manager of 'activating' benefits and self-responsibility. These 
changes, in turn, have affected notions of social citizenship, inclusion and exclusion, 
as well as the institutional organization of theWS. 
In this context, it is increasingly acknowledged that to fully understand the 
character and extent of WS transformations, scholars must examine how policies and 
services are being (re)organized, administered and delivered in advanced industrial 
societies (Borghi and van Berkel2007: 83), i.e., the 'operational' dimension of 
change (Carmel and Papadopoulos 2003). A literature on the territorial dimension of 
theWS has emerged (Ferrera 2005, Mabbett and Bolderson 1998; McEwen and 
Moreno 2005; Obinger et al. 2005b; Kazepov 2008; Williams and Mooney 2008), 
drawing attention to the notion that social policies are increasingly multi-layered and 
multi-level as competences are simultaneously shifting 'upwards' to supranational 
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bodies (such as the EU and the OECD)3 and 'downwards' to sub-national levels of 
government (Ferrera 2005): while the role of national/federal governments has 
changed. 
Work on the territorial dimension of the WS is still at an early stage. It tends to 
be case-specific and mostly covers (simultaneously) a variety of sectors without 
emphasizing the particularities and differences among policy areas. More 
specifically, this literature rarely addresses in a systematic way two important 
elements of contemporary WS-'welfare-to-work' or 'activation' policies and 
marketization5 or the inclusion of the private and voluntary sector in service design 
and provision. Marketization is a relevant trend as it moves the focus away from 
traditional organizers of social policy (i.e., public authorities) and captures the 
inclusion of the private and voluntary sectors in the provision, management and 
delivery of labor market policy (LMP) and services (Kazepov 2008). 
Whilst the literature on the territorial dimension of theWS does not 
specifically focus on activation policies, it is conversely true that the activation 
literature does not primarily address the spatial re-configuration of these policies6 
The latter literature has mainly focused on the conceptualization of different 
activation regimes, the question of convergence, and/or the impact of welfare-to-work 
policies on Iabor market outcomes and the content of social polices7 Thus, this body 
of work has not tended to bring institutions into its analysis. To examine the degrees, 
types, and reasons for WS re-configuration and its relationship to the activation 
paradigm, this paper links both of these strands of work. More specifically, we 
develop a cross-national, empirical analysis of the spatial re-configuration of LMP in 
the Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). We also briefly examine trends 
towards marketization in those cases where this development is a significant trend. 
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The three countries represent contrasting examples of political systems and 
welfare regimes. Italy belongs to the southern European welfare regime and is a 
regionalized country. Germany is a prototype of the conservative welfare regime and 
a federal state. Finally, the UK represents a liberal welfare regime and a unitary state 
which has devolved some powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1998). The choice of these three countries allows us to 
compare re-configuration dynamics by taking into account different welfare regimes 
and intergovernmental settings. The data presented here come from domestic reports, 
official documents and thirty semi-structured interviews conducted with political 
actors and experts in Italy, Germany, and the UK, as well as from the EU and the 
OECD. 
THE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF OPERATIONAL CHANGE 
Many scholars have referred to the notion of globalization and related 
pressures for competitiveness as a source for the spatial re-organizations of the state. 
For example, the literature on state re-scaling assumes that national governments 
respond to globalization by entering international and supra-national regimes, while 
shifting certain policy responsibilities to sub-national levels of government (Brenner 
1999; Jessop 2002). To describe these trends, public discourses on WS 
decentralization and other 'operational' changes emphasize factors such as increased 
effectiveness of policies through locally tailored solutions and more 'market choice,' 
increased legitimacy and innovation through direct participation of local authorities 
and citizens, and greater accountability of the state (Smith 1985: 4f.; De Vries 2000; 
OECD2003). 
Whereas the existing literature on the territorial dimension of theWS links the 
resurgence of political identities with shifts in social policy authorities and features of 
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social citizenship, we suggest that changing political identities are not a key source of 
the spatial re-organization of welfare-to-work policies. Rather, efficiency calculations 
regarding what level of government is superior in administering and managing a 
policy area, framed within the paradigm of activation, appear as relevant factors in our 
case studies. 
We claim that the activation approach carries a tension between the 
decentralization and centralization of LMPs. More specifically, as both the national 
and the sub-national levels have acquired new powers and responsibilities over social 
policies, recent trends have led to what we call decentralization within centralization. 
On the one hand, welfare-to-work emphasizes rights and responsibilities of socially 
excluded people that are translated into national legally binding regulations of 
eligibility and conditionality of benefit receipt to ensure uniformity and universality. 
On the other hand, activation approaches tend to focus on integrating people with 
multiple disadvantages into the labor market, e.g., disabled people, lone parents, 
young people, people over 50 and ethnic minorities. Welfare-to-work policies for this 
clientele seek to provide services for overcoming specific problems, such as 
insufficient skills, lack of affordable childcare, low self-esteem, or debt issues. In 
addition, when there are salient regional cleavages (as in the case ofltaly), these 
policies also become 'developmental' policies as they seek to close structural gaps. In 
this context, designing appropriate and effective measures calls for decentralization 
and marketization as it requires familiarity with local settings, as well as sufficient 
flexibility to tailor these measures to personal and local circumstances. These trends 
have been common across many advanced industrial states, including the United 
States, Spain, Italy, Belgium, UK, and Germany. 
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The three case studies presented in the following sections analyze the degree 
to which activation policies are connected to domestic projects of re-configuration of 
LMPs, including 'decentralization within centralization.' Moreover, we examine 
which factors are driving these cross-national trends, i.e., ethnic/national pressures, 
domestic processes of policy reconfiguration (e.g., regionalization, federalization, 
devolution) (e.g., Keating and McEwen 2005, McEwen and Moreno 2006), and/or 
efficiency and effectiveness-related reforms of public sector management. To do this, 
the following sections examine trends of spatial re-configurations in the respective 
countries, while the conclusion provides a systematic comparison of our cases. 
ITALY 
There has been a clear trend towards the spatial re-configuration of the WS in 
Italy since the mid-1990s. These changes in the spatial configuration of social policies 
go hand in hand witb the 'regionalization' of the Italian state, as well as with the 
modernization of its limited WS. These changes have been ever-present in the Italian 
agenda, yet the transformation of the allocation of power across levels of government 
has been much contested. For instance, whereas the 1948 Constitution spelled out the 
legislative powers of the regions (including their capacity to legislate on matters 
regarding professional training), for many decades these constitutional mandates 
remained a dead letter8 In this context, the national level controlled the regions by 
"almost exclusively using earmarked funding" (Fargion 2005: 130) and by having 
responsibility over "direction and coordination" (Putnam 1993; Breton and Fraschini 
2003), including LMPs and services. 
In the 1990s, under the shadow of political decentralization and devolution, it 
became evident that the Italian WS needed to be reformed and expanded in part to 
improve the quality of ALMPs and the universality of passive LMPs (Negri and 
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Saraceno 1996; Borghi and Van Berkel 2007) as passive benefits mainly protected 
insiders (i.e., an ample pension system), while it excluded outsiders (e.g., limited, 
non-universal unemployment schemes). (Rueda (2006)9 In addition, job placement 
offices, managed by the national government through local offices of the Ministry of 
Labor, needed to be transformed from small, bureaucratic (often corrupt), record 
keeping offices to multi-functional institutions in order to carry out new and diverse 
services, including the provision of ALMPs. 
Labor Market Policy Re-configuration? 
Partially pushed by supranational pressures (e.g., European Monetary Union, 
the European Employment Strategy, and Structural Funds) and by failed attempts to 
enhance the prospects of the South, in the mid-1990s the mandates to implement the 
Constitutional provisions and the 1977 presidential decrees regarding local entities 
and the decentralization of competences on social policies were fully taken on board 
(OECD 2003; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004; Kazepov 2008), thus transforming the 
institutional organization of LMPs. In 1997 the Bassanini reform was introduced, 
which limited national responsibilities by giving intermediary and local governments 
power over most public administrative functions (Amoretti 2002; Breton and 
Fraschini 2003; Ongaro 2006). More specifically, the powers exercised by the 
national government through local placement offices were transferred to the regional 
level, creating the Sistemi Regionali per I' impiego. 
By receiving the mandate to elaborate laws to regulate the new system, 
regional administrations assumed exclusive responsibility for planning, structuring, 
coordinating, managing, and organizing employment offices (including the design of 
objectives) (Rubio Barcel6 2007: 90). In turn, the national ministry became 
accountable for establishing minimum standards and evaluating employment policies. 
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More specifically, the central level is responsible for: social security, pensions, 
securing social rights for all citizens, administering unemployment benefits and other 
passive labor market policies and determining the general line of ALMPs. 
These institutional changes envisage the integration ofPLMP and ALMP. To do 
this, ALMP became an exclusive responsibility of the regions (legislative power, 
administration, design, evaluation, and quality control of PESs ), which included the 
planning and coordination of a wide range of policy measures between public and 
private actors (Basic Information Report: Italy 2003; Fargion 2005;). Finally, the 
private sector was endowed with the provision of employment services, such as 
orientation, provision of skills, and placement, after fifty years of national 
monopoly. 10 These changes were formalized in 2001 (Constitutional law 3/2001), 
when the Italian public voted to amend the Constitution to give the regions exclusive 
competencies over employment policy and to enhance the legislative powers and 
fiscal autonomy of these entities. "The aim [was J to bring legislative and 
administrative regional remits into line with the new organizational planning 
structure, which has altered the relationship between legislation and administration" 
(Basic Information Report: Italy 2003: 3). 
By 200 I, 17 regions issued laws acknowledging the new decentralized system 
and 481 Employment Centers were created (which covered 2/3 of the country). In 
addition, since 2001, the regions have covered nearly 40% of their expenditure with 
their own revenue (Italian National Action Plan 2001). 
These developments have been further promoted in the 2000s as new initiatives 
and laws were passed to further implement the decentralization project within the 
activation paradigm. Table 2 summarizes the main national developments on the 
devolution of ALMP after the year 2000. It is important to note that in this period the 
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clash of political views regarding the effect of the re-configuration on social 
citizenship and on regional solidarity has had a huge impact on the likelihood of 
furthering this project as building up consensus has been at times very difficult. 
Table 2. The devolution of ALMPs in Italy: main developments 
LAW/ KEY POINTS 
AGREEMENT 
2000: Legislative decree Introduced new rules (obligations and sanctions) to 
no. 181/2000, Presidential match labor demands and supply with the aim of 
decree no. 442/2000 "activating" PESs. Established that job centers had to 
(Implementing measures deliver new services to the long-term unemployed 
to improve free placement (counseling and work-entry schemes). 
services) 
2000: Framework law Defmed universal and cross-regional levels of social 
no. 328/2000 services. Sought to coordinate PLMP with ALMP. 
(for the realization of an Emphasized the need to develop local concertation to 
integrated system of social develop ALMP. Gave more power to regions and 
intervention and services) municipalities to plan the provision of social services. 
2001: White Paper for Referred to "federalist decentralization" of the labor 
development market, and the activation, modernization, and 
liberalization of PES. Called for "social dialogue," 
instead of trilateral, corporatist arrangements. 
2002: Pact for Italy Covered "welfare to work" policies and the re-
(Patto per I' Italia) organization of PES. Introduced the concept of 
*signed by the "active protection" (emphasis on obligation and 
government and the social monitoring). Emphasized the implementation of 
partners (with the Territorial Employment Pacts. 
exception of CGIL) 
2003: White Paper on Aimed at introducing a decentralized system of social 
Welfare Reform protection 
2003: Law no. 30/2003 Underlined the need to implement the reforms of the 
(Biagi Law) is approved late 1990s. Stressed the role of the regions as key 
by the Italian Senate actors in ALMPn Defmed a new system of public 
(previously Proxy law no. and private employment services, which would 
848)11 provide greater room for private intermediation. 
Underlined the notions of "welfare to work" and 
flexibility. 
In th1s penod, soc1al partners and local actors were also ac!Jvely engaged w1th 
the decentralization project as they sought to transform the local institutional 
architecture. To do this, they searched for alternative models of development 
characterized by less "top-down" intervention and local territorial concertation (Melo 
2000; Barbera 2001; Cersosimo and Wolleb 2001). These partnerships differed from 
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past initiatives in that many of them were embedded in a national framework (Borghi 
and V an Berkel 2007). Consequently, the social partners and the govermnent 
engaged in a variety of measures (programmazione negoziata) geared towards the 
development of depressed areas. One of the most significant measures were the 
"Territorial Pacts" (OECD 2001; OECD 2003; European Commission 2004), 
grounded in a bottom-up, horizontal model of cooperation to support the creation of 
capital and local autonomy. In part, the pacts sought to expand the 'social triangle' by 
actively including a variety of local actors, such as banks, NGOs, and private 
providers. Between 1998 and 2000, 230 Italian Territorial Pacts were approved 
(Italian Govermnent 2003) and their blueprint was used by the EU as a model to 
launch their own European Territorial Employment Pacts (1997)-" 
The message stated in the Italian National Action Plan (Italian govermnent 
2003: 5, author's translation) summarizes the Italian project of re-configuration: 
Given the characteristics of the Italian labor market under a process of 
decentralization and devolution, to implement the notion of "welfare to 
work" the govermnent intends to promote a bilateral and territorial model of 
implementation. Territorialita entails the development of bargaining 
mechanisms among the govermnent, the regions, provinces and the social 
partners to agree on a way to implement the reform of the labor market and 
of LMP in a coordinated and efficient manner. 
Yet for many people this remains a goal, not a reality, as some have argued that the 
process has been characterized by high levels of centralization, lack of coherence and 
a hierarchical implementation style (Ferrera and Gualmini 2005: 109). In addition, the 
re-configuration ofLMPs and services has been highly politicized, thus slowing down 
potential reforms to further implement these mandates. 14 At this point there are 
limited evaluations of these initiatives, but many would agree that there are huge 
differences across regions (including the degree of national involvement) and that the 
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central government still plays a significant role in establishing the direction ofLMPs, 
while regions are slowly becoming stronger entities. 
In snm, there has been a noticeable re-structuring of the WS in Italy, which fits 
within the project of 'administrative federalism' and which occurred in the general 
context of closing the regional gap, regionalization, devolution, and decentralization. 
Regions have become key planners, administrators, and implementers of multiple 
LMPs and institutions (e.g., PESs). Yet in order to avoid regional heterogeneity, the 
central government has retained control over: I) common defmitions regarding levels 
of benefits across regions, 2) basic functions of the PESs, and 3) treatment of 
unemployed people (Dau 2003). The main driver of reform were calculations based 
on the question: "which level of government is best equipped to carry out a policy 
(e.g., activation)?," rather than on other factors, such as regional mobilization of 
interest groups (Trigilia 1991 ). 
GERMANY 
Germany provides a clear example for the tensions surrounding the re-
configuration of LMPs. These tensions become apparent in the conflicts surrounding 
the administrative design of the Hartz IV reform which has been the most important 
LMP reform during the past decade. It was introduced in 2005 to launch a new 
nationally operating system of LMP to previous employment and social assistance 
recipients, which were administered by local authorities. The implementation of the 
Hartz IV reform required collaboration between the Federal Employment Agency 
(FEA) and local authorities as both bodies were responsible for the delivery of 
different aspects of the new benefit regime. However, as it will be shown, this 
collaboration has been confronted with a tange of constitutional and administrative 
problems. 
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Germany is a federation in which competencies are shared between the federal 
level and the Liinder. In the area of LMP, the federal government plays a major role. 
This is partly due to a constitutional principle stating that the federal level has the 
right to legislate in those areas in which the establishment of equal living standards 
across the different Land er or the maintenance of legal and economic unity justifies 
federal law (Schoeider 2004: 85; Obinger et al. 2005a: 8ff.). Therefore, the federal 
level regulates unemployment benefits and ALMP. The German WS is characterized 
by two schemes: I) contribution-based benefits and ALMP, based on the Social 
Security Code Ill (SGB Ill), and 2) means-tested unemployment benefits, based on 
the new Social Security Code 11 introduced in 2005 with the Hartz reform. Within 
this institutional framework, the Liinder are allowed to set up their own ALMP 
programs; however, these programs, which are eo-financed by the federal level and 
the European Structural Funds, must complement existing federal measures. 
Before the introduction ofHartz IV, the municipalities had an important role to 
play in integrating social assistance recipients into the labor market. For that purpose 
they could set up their own programs. Their responsibilities, however, have changed 
since the introduction of Hartz IV as explained in the following section. 
A Re-configuration of labor market policy? 
The developments surrounding the potential re-configuration of LMPs in 
Germany are mixed. The Hartz IV reform (2005), which created the new Social 
Security Code 11 (SGB 11), merged unemployment and social assistance into a new 
means-tested, 'welfare-to-work' unemployment benefit regime. 15 SGB II requires 
those who are able to work to seek a job as a condition of benefit receipt. SGB 11 is 
currently implemented in three different models. In the first model, which has been 
adopted by 346 local districts, the FEA and municipalities form new local consortia 
(ARGEn). According to this model, the FEA is responsible for benefit payments and 
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ALMP, whereas the local authority is responsible for accommodation and heating 
costs as well as debt counseling. Under the second model, SGB I! is autonomously 
implemented by municipalities, which are also responsible for benefit payments and 
the provision of ALMPs. This model has been chosen by 69 districts. Finally in 24 
districts SGB I! has been implemented by both the FEA and the municipality, but 
without the formation of a consortium between both levels of government (separated 
implementation). The legislator determined that not more than 69 districts were 
allowed to adopt the "municipal model." Apart from that local districts were free to 
choose which model they preferred. 16 
The implementation of SGB I! has been accompanied by administrative and 
legal problems. In December 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the 
first model of implementation, i.e. the direct collaboration between the FEA and 
municipalities in local consortia, is not coherent with Germany's constitution as it 
violates the principle of 'municipal self-administration', meaning that the federal level 
cannot directly regulate any matters for which the municipalities are responsible. 
According to this decision, the legislator must find a new solution that must be 
compatible with the constitution, to be implemented until2010. To solve this 
problem, in spring 2008, the Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs 
suggested introducing new 'cooperative jobcentres' in which the different SGB I! 
services would be implemented separately by the FEA and the municipalities. These 
two bodies would still closely cooperate on a contractual basis (BMAS/BA 2008). 
This model is similar to the one adopted in the 24 districts of separate implementation. 
The questions on the table are: Has the introduction of SGB I! led to a re-
configuration of LMP in Germany? What is the potential for re-configuration 
according to the possible models ofSGB I! implementation to be adopted by 2010? 
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One main argument supporting the view that the Hartz IV reform has actually 
contributed to a centralization ofLMP is that the municipalities collaborating with the 
FEA in implementing SGB II must now implement federal law more directly than 
previously. This means that they have lost their autonomy in designing local 
integration measures. Under the.model currently proposed by the Federal Ministry for 
Employment and Social Affairs, there is a high chance that the FEA will be the more 
powerful partner in the implementation process. Yet, if the implementation of SGB II 
were delegated to the municipalities then this would represent a significant move 
towards decentralization; nonetheless, currently the adoption of this model seems 
unlikely. By contrast, Hartz IV has institutionalized a more localized and flexible 
system of ALMP for the majority of the unemployed, as the local consortia have more 
discretion regarding the provision of ALMP within SGB II than local FEA offices 
implementing the SGB Ill. In 2006, amongst all unemployed people there were 
almost 80% SGB II and only about 20% SGB Ill recipients (Bundesagentur fur Arbeit 
2007: 80). However, this only applies to the provision of ALMP, whilst overall, the 
municipalities' role in integrating long-term unemployed into the labor market is now 
more directly subsumed under a federally operating system. 
Overall, the conclusion regarding the re-configuration of LMPs in Germany, 
therefore, remains ambivalent The introduction of Hartz IV signifies an inherent 
tension between standardization and localization borne by activation policies. 
Activation policies, including those that were previously solely run by municipalities, 
have been integrated into a more comprehensive, federally operating system, whilst 
the FEA is now required to collaborate more closely with the municipalities, 
providing for personalized and localized approaches. 
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THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom is another example which demonstrates the increasing 
tension between centralization and decentralization within activation approaches. 
Overall, the UK displays a fairly centralized system of LMP, particularly in relation to 
the short-term unemployed. However, when it comes to policies for the 'hard-to-
place', one can argue that there is a slight trend towards decentralization and more 
local flexibility as well as a significant trend towards out-contracting of service 
delivery. This section briefly describes the centralized system of rights and 
responsibilities and the operation of the national employment service and social 
security benefit agency for working-age people (Jobcenter Plus). We also discuss the 
role of devolution and analyze more recent trends of regional targeting and out-
contracting. 
In the UK, the national level legislates on ALMP provisions and unemployment 
benefits, better known as the Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)17 These regulations cover 
the eligibility and conditionality of benefit receipt, as well as relatively standardized 
and precise rules regarding access to and operation of the New Deal programs which 
are the main and nationally operating ALMPs. In comparison to Germany and Italy, 
where ALMPs are discretionary, the ALMP system is more standardized and 
centralized in the UK. For instance, Jobcentre Plus, which administers JSA and 
ALMPs, is not autonomous but rather a government agency that is part of the 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). Thus, the system of LMP service delivery 
is hierarchically organized, directly "steered" by the ministry and operates within a 
national 'Standard Operating Model.' Based on these very detailed and nationally 
operating standards, Jobcentre Plus staff can determine, for example, how and when 
customers have access to services, what type of interview the customer is entitled (and 
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obliged) to attend, and when a client can become eligible for the New Deal programs. 
Within this system, the local Jobcentre Plus offices have relatively little discretion 
about how to use the financial resources allocated to them. 18 
As aforementioned, the most important ALMP provisions, the New Deal 
programs, are managed nationally as well. For instance, the central govermnent 
legislates on the criteria for people to access these programs, the concrete design of 
the schemes and options available. The programs can be classified as an activation 
approach, thus making participation in intensified job-search, training and work 
experience options compulsory for young unemployed people after six months, and 
for the long-term unemployed usually after 18 months. 
Overall, one can argue that both the unemployment benefit and the ALMP 
systems are centralized in the UK and they have become even more standardized 
through the introduction of JSA (1996), Jobcentre Plus (2001) and the New Deal 
programs (introduced in different stages from 1998 on). However, some recent 
developments and planned reforms point to more local flexibility and re-
configuration, which are examined in the following section. 
Labor market policy re-configuration? 
To assess the degree ofLMP re-configuration in the UK, first we must discuss 
recent patterns of devolution. At first sight, devolution in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland has not directly affected the configuration of ALMPs in the UK 
because the devolved administrations have no authority to legislate in this area. 
However, these regions have acquired competencies over education, skills, health, and 
social inclusion policies, which are tightly linked to activation policies. This has 
required close coordination between the central govermnent and the devolved 
administrations resulting in slight administrative variations in the delivery of these 
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programs. In addition, to make the most vulnerable groups in society more 
'employable', the devolved administrations can set up their own programs to provide 
additional support to this population (Scott 2006: 647ff.). Based on these 
developments, it can be argued that while devolution has not affected the standard 
system of passive and active LMPs for short-term unemployed people, responsibilities 
have become more decentralized for people with multiple barriers to the labor market. 
In addition, during the last decade there has been a trend towards regional 
targeting, personalizing services and out-contracting of service delivery, which 
sometimes occur in tandem, leading to greater regional or local flexibility and 
variability of service delivery. Table I provides an overview of the different initiatives 
that have been introduced, or increasingly used, in the last decade in the UK. 
Table 1. Re-configuration in the United Kingdom 
REGIONAL TARGETING AND OUTSOURCING/ 
LOCAL FLEXIBILITY PARTNERSHIPS 
• Cities strategy (2006) • Employment Zones (2000) 
• Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy • Local Strategic Partnerships 
(2001) and Working (2000) 
Neighbourhood Fund (2007) • New Deal for disabled people 
• Local Area Agreements (2004) (2001) 
• Pathways to work (2006) 
• Planned service delivery by 
specialized providers outside 
Jobcentre Plus after 12 month of 
unemployment (DWP 2007b) 
First, there has been an increasing trend towards 'regional targeting' -specific 
programs, also called 'area-based initiatives', that seek to promote social inclusion 
and community building in deprived areas (Alcock 2003). A range of different 
initiatives can be mentioned here, for example the recent Cities Strategy19, the 
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy (Cabinet Office 2001) and it's new 'Working 
Neighbourhood Fund' 20 and Local Area Agreements which are adopted by Local 
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Strategic Partnerships21 Some of these programs have discretionary funding available 
to develop social inclusion and employability measures and most of them are 
implemented in local private-public partnerships. For example, the Cities Strategy, 
which was set up in 2006 and is currently tested in 15 pathfinder areas across 
England, brings together the public, private, and voluntary sectors to design local 
strategies for tackling worklessness in areas with very high unemployment rates. City 
Strategy consortia in each pathfinder area can decide how to spend the financial 
resources available. 
Second, there has been a trend towards marketization or out-contracting of 
service delivery. For example, the delivery of the New Deal programs, including 
benefit payments, is out-contracted in 13 so-called 'employment zones', which have 
been introduced in areas with particularly high unemployment (Bruttel 2005). These 
private providers have more flexibility than Jobcentre Plus, when it comes to the 
implementation of these programs. Within the regular New Deal programs, the 
provision of services related to the 'option phases'22 is also out-contracted to the 
private and voluntary sector. Out-contracting is particularly prevalent within the New 
Deal for Disabled People. In addition, the delivery of the second round of 'Pathways 
to Work', a labour market integration program for incapacity benefit recipients (DWP 
2002), has been out -contracted. 
Finally, within the current Labor goverrnnent's welfare reform plans, it is also 
foreseen to render the New Deal programs more flexible and personalized to target 
particularly disadvantaged unemployed people (DWP 2007a; DWP 2007b ). The 
government intends to make some ALMP measures available much earlier than they 
are available now and to provide instant access to ALMP for particularly 
disadvantages customers (DWP 2007b: 15). Jobcentre Plus will remain the main 
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service provider for all unemployed people during the first 12 months of 
unemployment. However, the welfare reform agenda also intends to refer unemployed 
people to specialist private or voluntary sector service providers after 12 months of 
unemployment on the assumption that this customer group is "likely to have serious 
and multiple challenges" (DWP 2007b: 15). 
To sum up, the UK is still a fairly centralized LMP system, particularly for the 
short-term unemployed. For this customer group it has arguably even become more 
standardized through the introduction of Jobcentre Plus and its 'Standard Operating 
Model' and the New Deal system. However, within this framework, there is an 
increasing trend towards local flexibility, discretion, regional variability and out-
contracting to the private and voluntary sector to strengthen efforts to integrate 
particularly disadvantaged groups into the labor market. 
Having presented the case studies, the following section highlights the main 
findings of our study. We then conclude with a discussion of theoretical concepts 
together with the potential implications of our findings on the spatial re-configuration 
of theWS in the EU. 
DISCUSSION OF CROSS-NATIONAL TRENDS 
A cross-national comparison of re-configuration trends in the three countries 
shows significant differences, as well as similarities, regarding the characters and 
degrees of these transformations and their particular justifications. Dissimilar trends 
can be linked to country-specific political situation and institutions, as well as LMP 
approaches. In addition, decentralization in some areas can be paralleled by 
centralization and a standardization of rules and obligations in other areas. Common 
cross-national developments and trends are presented in table 3. 
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Table 3. Summarizing the findings: cross-national trends 
TRENDS 
Centralization/Standardization - Unemployment Benefits (IT, G, UK) 
-General ALMP standards (G, UK) 
-Operation of PES (G, UK), Basic 
functions of the PES (IT) 
Decentralization - ALMP legislation, PES organization 
(IT) 
- More flexibility and responsibilities in 
the implementation and management of 
ALMP (IT, G, UK) 
- Support for local ALMP initiatives (IT, 
G, UK) 
Marketization - Local initiatives and services created 
and provided by public-private 
partnerships (IT, G, UK) 
In the Italy, Germany and the UK, central governments retam an Important role 
in the design of Jaw on unemployment benefits. In addition, it oversees the policies 
and services managed and provided by sub-national entities, particularly by PESs. 
With the new emphasis on activation, in all three countries there has been a shift 
towards centralization and standardization of rights, benefits, and obligations for the 
short-term unemployed. This means that the same rules, set at the central level, apply 
nation-wide (for instance, the UK model of the personal adviser and the Jobseeker's 
agreement and the German integration agreement). Furthermore, in Germany and the 
UK, the national government remains the dominant actor in the legislation of ALMP, 
whereas in Italy ALMP has been devolved to the regions. 
To understand centralization and standardization, we must refer to the 
arguments regarding the disadvantages of decentralization, specifically to issues ·of 
inequalities of performance and access to benefits services across sub-units (primarily 
held by social democratic parties in these three countries). These concerns are crucial 
to comprehend why in these countries the central government plays a protagonist role 
in setting national legislation and uniform standards as this level of government 
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attempts to establish a homogenous set of rules all involved players should comply 
with, including different levels of government and beneficiaries. For instance, in 
Germany the constitutional principle that national legislation is required to maintain 
equivalence ofliving standards across regions remains crucial, whereas in the UK the 
Labor government has supported the principle ofuniversalism in the area of 
unemployment insurance. In Italy, the regional gap supports the role of the central 
government as strong overseer. 
Second, and in contrast to the former point, our research shows that in all three 
countries sub-national levels have gained more competencies and flexibility regarding 
the implementation and management of ALMP. This development was most 
pronounced in Italy with its process of decentralization, which includes the reform 
and modernization of PESs. As a consequence, Italian regions have the exclusive 
authority for ALMP legislation. The UK, by contrast, remains the most centralized 
country of our sample, particularly regarding LMPs for the 'mainstream unemployed.' 
The devolved UK regions did not gain new competencies in LMP, and only the 
implementation of programs for particularly disadvantaged groups has become more 
flexible and regionally diversified. This is mainly due to the UK's legacy as a unitary 
state, and the New Labour's emphasis on standardized rights and responsibilities and 
local flexibility to target the 'hard to place.' Finally, in Germany, the developments 
regarding decentralization are ambivalent because the Hartz IV reform brought about 
a certain degree of centralization and standardization in LMP, whilst it also provided 
for a closer collaboration between the FEA and the municipalities. Overall, the 
situation in Germany could be described as a recalibration of relationships between 
the federal and the municipal levels within a federal framework, rather than a 
dismantlement of the system. 
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In all three countries, the decentralization agenda is mainly driven by a re-
framing and a reform ofLMP-moving from 'passive' and demand-led policies to a 
supply-side approach based on the agendas of 'activation' and 'employability' that 
includes the modernization of the PE Ss. Welfare-to work approaches, on one hand, 
require a clear 'universal rights and responsibilities framework' and, on the other 
hand, entail more localized and tailored approaches to provide specialized and holistic 
services to the most disadvantaged groups in society. Moreover, in Germany and in 
Italy, the decentralization of LMP is potentially related to ongoing institutional 
reforms which seek to establish a clearer division of responsibilities between the 
different levels of government. 
Third, private actors and the voluntary sector increasingly play a key role in the 
implementation, management, and delivery of policies. In all three countries, the out-
contracting of services to the private and voluntary sectors, as well as internal reforms 
within the PES are directly linked to a more general agenda of public management 
reform. In these scenarios, one should also take into account the role played by the 
EU (specifically the open market and free competition principles) which has ruled 
against public monopolies over job placement, as the Italian case illustrates. 
But, what has driven these trends in these countries? Based on our fmdings, 
different reasons were dominant for the changes observed. The developments in 
Germany are mainly driven by the introduction of a new 'activation' and 
'employability' framework. Germany's major LMP reform, the Hartz laws, bore an 
inherent tension between centralization and decentralization as the federal level 
became responsible for activating the 'hard to place' whilst the municipalities 
continue to play an important role in the implementation of this scheme. In the UK, 
more local flexibility for integrating particularly disadvantaged groups into the labor 
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market is closely linked to out-contracting service delivery. These reforms seem to be 
mainly driven by a new emphasis on 'activating' the most disadvantaged people in 
society as well as broader new public management reforms. The radical 
decentralization of ALMP legislation in Italy is mainly a side-effect of a general 
attempt to reform and restructure the Italian (welfare) state, which included the reform 
of the PES. In addition, this trend is also justified by the 'activation' agenda, which is 
extremely salient at the EU level. 
Having presented these general fmdings, in the following section we return to 
the theoretical question that drives this article ~ why re-configure? ~ to put forward a 
set of general hypotheses about what drives LMP re-configuration. 
THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A number of general hypotheses and conclusions can be drawn from our 
study, which can be tested and applied to other states. The new emphasis on activation 
and employability in advanced industrial countries does not only include a change in 
policy content but also implies transformation in the ways in which LMPs are 
institutionally organized and implemented. A general tension seems to exist between a 
national and standardized framework for this approach, on one hand, and the 
requirement to introduce more locally flexible, decentralized and personalized 
implementation strategies facilitating labor market integration of multiple 
disadvantaged groups in society, on the other hand. More specifically, it is commonly 
argued that services aiming at labor market integration of the most disadvantaged 
groups in society need to be more flexible and tailored to local needs. Given new 
paradigms ofLMP provision, based on the activation agenda, policy-makers regard 
sub national levels as better equipped to create regional and local policies to provide 
personalized services. In addition, decentralization allows governments to supply 
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differentiated services given specific personal and regional conditions. At the same 
time, the findings show that the principles of social citizenship and universalism are 
still crucial within political discourses as centralization is the institutional solution to 
guarantee a set of benefits across regions. 
The tension between standardization and local flexibility leads to more 
complex relationships between different levels of governments as central levels of 
government retain key roles in LMP whereas sub-national levels gain more autonomy 
and flexibility regarding the 'activation' of the hard-to-place. Overall, LMP in Europe 
is increasingly characterized by a multi-level governance framework, not only within 
states but also in the context of European integration as the EU has taken on new roles 
in coordinating and monitoring LMP (L6pez-Santana 2006; Biichs 2007). Overall, all 
levels of government- the European, national, and sub-national -have taken on new 
roles in 'operating' and managing LMPs. It is, therefore, not accurate to talk of 
general trends towards centralization or decentralization of the WS, rather it appears 
as if there is an increasing inter-linkage of different layers of government and actors 
in which certain levels take over specific roles regarding certain policy-making 
functions. 
In the second part of the paper, we pointed out that the spatial re-configuration 
of LMPs can be explained by three different factors: I) as part of a process of WS 
restructuring, which emphasizes the implementation of welfare-to-work approaches, 
2) as a side-effect of a restructuring of the institutional architecture of a polity, and 3) 
as led by demands of sub-national gronps and regions. Whilst the emphasis on 
welfare-to-work or activation seems to be a common factor across countries, we found 
that a resurgence of sub-national loyalties and political identities, as suggested by the 
emergent literature on the territorial dimension of the welfare state (McEwen and 
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Moreno 2006) is not relevant for this policy area. Further research is required to 
establish whether that is commonly the case or whether sub-national identities can be 
a driver of reforms, for example in countries such as Spain where sub-national levels 
have asked the national level for more power to manage ALMP within a process of 
regionalization. In this way, and as proven by the Italian case, decentralization can be 
part of a more general reform of domestic constitutional structures. 
Overall, our research demonstrates that changes in policy content (i.e., 
activation and employability) can imply wide-ranging reforms in domestic balances of 
power and institutional configurations. The newly emerging multi-level framework of 
LMP raises new questions regarding authority migration, including where power 
should ultimately reside and what level should be accountable, the management of the 
increasingly complex and overlapping responsibilities of different levels of 
govermnent, the financial implications of these arrangements, as well as the chances 
for innovation and experimentation. 
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NOTES 
1 Several concepts are used to refer to the notion of 'activation' (e.g., welfare-to-work 
or workfare or work-first policies). Since we are not making any assumptions on the 
type of activation regime prevalent in any one country we simply refer to welfare-to-
work or activation policies. 
2 PLMPs provide income maintenance to the unemployed and inactive and have 
increasingly been suspected of generating 'dependency.' Traditional ALMPs focus 
on incorporating the unemployed population into the labor market through (re-) 
training, demand-side policies or temporary public employment initiatives. 
3 There is an extensive body ofliterature on the 'upward transfer' and its effect on 
member states (e.g. Geyer 2000; Leibfried 2005; Biichs 2007). 
4 Some scholars have also focused on the impact of the territorial organization of the 
WS on the generosity of social benefits (Obinger et al. 2005a; Obinger et al. 2005). 
5 Research examining recent trends of privatization, out-contracting and new public 
management in the delivery of social policies has become increasingly salient. For 
example, see Clarke and Newman 1997, Le Grand 2007; Powe112007. 
6 Social Policy and Society has recently published an issues on the 'governance of 
activation,' see van Berkel and Borghi (2008), Bredgaard and Larsen (2008). 
7 For instance, see L0demel and Trickey 2000; Pierson 2001; van Berkel and 
Homemann 2002; M0ller 2002; Handler 2003; Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; 
Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007. 
8 In the 1970s, there was a brief wave of decentralization, which resulted in the 
creation of 15 Regional governments with legislative, administrative, and some 
spending powers. 
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9 Italy does not have a national income safety net and a uniform system of social 
assistance (Borghi and Van Berkel2007: 92). Ferrera and Gualmini (2004) argue that 
the LMPs are very fragmented given their incremental and reactive development. 
10 This was introduced by the 'Treu package' (Law 196/1997) and ruled by the 
Decreta Montecchi (Law no. 469/97). it was made compulsory by the European 
Court of Justice (1997) given that it ruled that the Italian state's monopoly over job 
placement was illegal and contrary to the principles of free competition. 
11 See, Italian government (2003). 
12 This mandate puts special emphasis on decentralization not stopping at the regional 
level, but also including provinces and municipalities given that these entities are 
responsible for the administration and implementation of the reform. 
13 There is ample literature on Italian territorial pacts, for instance, refer to Cerase 
(2005), Piera (2005), Magnatti, et al. (2005), and De Vivo (2006). 
14 Following what some labeled neo-liberal and European trends, the Center-Right 
and the Lega-Nord have been firm believers in the decentralization ofLMP. However, 
the Center-Left, the Left, and Catholic groups have not supported the re-configuration 
because it could undermine social citizenship rights and lead to differentiation and 
divergence across regions, thus, possibly exacerbating the regional divide (Fargion 
2005). 
15 SGB II now complements the contribution-based unemployment benefit regime 
based on Social Security Code Ill (SGB Ill). 
16 These figures are based on an internal document from the FEA, sent to the authors 
bye-mail on June 2"d, 2008. 
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17 There are two different types of JSA, one is contribution-based and available to 
those who paid sufficient social security contributions, the other is 'income-based' or 
means-tested for those who have not paid sufficient social security contributions or 
are no longer eligible for contribution-based JSA. 
18 The only funds that can be spent with some degree of discretion are the "District 
Manager's and the Personal Advisor's Discretion Funds" which are, however, 
relatively restricted. 
19 The Cities Strategy aims at "[tackling] worklessness in our most disadvantaged 
communities across the UK" 
(http://www.dwp.gov.uk!welfarereforrn/cities strategy. asp, accessed May 28 2008. 
Also refer to DWP (2006), Freud (2007). 
20 This fund replaces the previous Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. Together with the 
previous Deprived Areas Fund it merges into one individual fund. 
21 Local Strategic Partrerships (LSPs) are non-statutory and non-executive 
partnerships between public, private and voluntary organizations at the local level. 
Their aim is to design more effective strategies to tackle deprivation and other 
problems at the local level through collaboration. LSPs now exist in the majority of 
local authority areas in England (Geddes et al. 2007). 
22 If an unemployed person on the New Deal for young people enters the 'option 
phase' (or the 'Intensive Activity Period Phase in the New Deal for Long-Term 
Unemployed Persons) she will be offered either a subsidized job with an employer, 
occupational training, general employment related skills training or support with 
applications and interview technique. The rejection of an "offer'' can lead to benefit 
sanctions. 
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